[Technology Report]
Beyond The "Great Recession"
Do downturns spawn transformational technologies that would otherwise have been neglected?
Don Tuite
ED Online ID #21295
June 18, 2009
Copyright © 2006 Penton Media, Inc., All rights reserved. Printing of this document is for personal use only.
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If one looks at the last 50 years
of engineering boom-and-bust
cycles and correlates them with
the “stealth” technologies that
emerged during those periods, one
can see an encouraging pattern:
breakthrough technologies take
root during the crises and eventually
transform the industry. Often, few people
initially grasp these technologies or their
potential. It’s also regrettably demonstrable
that the actual pioneers have rarely been the
ones to reap the big rewards.
TAILFIN RECESSION
Start a little more than 50 years ago, in
1958, right after Sputnik and about the time I
built my first radio (a Knight “Space Spanner”
from Allied Radio). Across the auto industry,
tailfins grew to what would be their maximum
useless size, yet auto sales still took a big hit
(Fig. 1). Some corny industry ads exclaimed
“You ‘auto’ buy now!” Consumer and wholesale
prices rose across the board.
According to economists, that recession
didn’t really end until early 1961, when
President Kennedy kicked off the race to
the moon. But in terms of engineering, the
recovery and ensuing boom was in part due to
earlier government investments in technology
education (see “Give ’Em a Buck”).
This boom was also the first to build on the
root technology that powered the latter half of
the 20th century, the semiconductor IC. This
technology goes back to the work of Jacobi,
Dummer, Darlington, Kilby, and Noyce (Fig.
2). Kilby and Noyce were probably the first
engineers who had a clear vision of where IC
technology might lead. Not me. I must
have been seduced by the warm glow
of the 12AT7 in that Space Spanner.
I remember reading about Kilby’s
work in 1959, when I was in high
school, and naively wondering whether
it would be possible to scale passives
as readily as transistors. Actually,
it was a long time before we moved
beyond through-hole assembly, but
passives scaled as rapidly as clock
rates and rise times required them to.
Another technology from this era
took longer to become pervasive—directsequence
spread-spectrum (DSSS) modulation.
One day in a senior EE circuits class,
our TA, who was doing his PhD research at
Bell Labs, came to class apparently lacking
a planned lesson. Somewhat orthogonally to
what we had been covering, he delivered a
brilliantly clear lecture on autocorrelation and
its application to signal processing.
He was so articulate, I could have replicated
that lecture for at least several days
afterward. (It wasn’t going to be on the final.)
I recognized the concept nearly 20 years later
when it reared its head in two applications in
particular that have since became pervasive,
GPS and wireless networking.
AEROSPACE CRASHES
I had to set that lecture aside until IC capabilities
caught up with the theory. Meanwhile,
by the time I finished college in 1966, the
aerospace boom had reached a crescendo,
and I moved to Los Angeles to get a piece of
the action—for a time.
Economists don’t label it a recession. But
in late 1969, if you were an engineer working
anywhere in the aerospace or defense industries,
it sure felt like one. The folks in Los
Angeles who had sent Eagle to the moon took
it hard. Seattle, where Boeing lost the C5A
jumbo military transport to Lockheed-Georgia
and had to shut down the 2707 SST in 1971,
took it really hard.
The company went from a peak of 100,800
employees in 1967 to 38,690 in April 1971.
That month, two real estate agents with a
taste for irony put the message “Will the last
person leaving Seattle —Turn out the lights”
on a billboard a few blocks down Pacific
Highway from Sea-Tac airport.
By that point, the worst was past for many
EEs. Boeing’s payroll was up to 53,300 by
October 1971. Down in L.A., I had turned
in my Yellow Cab taxi-driver’s hat and gone
to work for an aircraft antenna company.
However, few anticipated the stock market
crash that started in January 1973 and lasted
until December 1974. The Dow lost more than
45% (after picking up 15% in 1972). That’s
before factoring in the effects of the Arab oil
embargo. Things were worse overseas.
While aerospace crashed, never to recover
the glamour it had during the 1960s, the microcontroller tiptoed into our lives. Intel
released the 4004 in late 1971. I never saw
one of the Busicom four-function handheld
calculators that used it, but I was impressed
when a hotshot consultant showed us salaried
grunt engineers his new HP35 in 1972. (It was
early enough that his calculator had the famous
“2.02 ln ex bug.” That’s the keypad entry in
reverse-Polish notation, and the result on the
calculator was truncated to “2.”) The HP35 CPU
was a custom chipset, though, oriented to the
calculator’s stack architecture (Fig. 3).
This was, in a word, awesome. At the time,
engineers at the antenna company I worked
for performed their heavy computations using
a single Teletype KSR-33 to access Tymnet’s
mainframe. We entered data offline, creating
tapes on the Teletype’s built-in punch, and
generally spooled output to the punch, which
was faster than the TTY. We’d make readable
printouts offline.
Actually, Tymnet was more useful than the
HP-35 for big, repetitive jobs. (There are lots of
iterations involved in modeling a horn antenna.)
But the idea of the HP-35 —that you could run
rings around a slide rule and eliminate order-ofmagnitude
errors (while adding many digits of
false precision) on a (nearly) affordable unit you
could slip into your pocket—was striking.
Of course, desktop scientific calculators
already existed. In its air-data computer division,
my previous employer had not one but
three Nixie-tubed Wang electronic slide rules for
all of its engineers to share. But they were the
size of the clackety-clack mechanical Marchant
calculators, relics of the Manhattan Project,
they replaced. In contrast, the HP-35 was half
the size of a Star Trek tricorder!
Continue to page 2
The sneaky thing about those chips, and
the Intel (and Motorola) 8- and 16-bit microcontrollers
to follow, is that it took a while
before many of us stopped thinking of them
as number-crunchers that could be forced into
other roles and started seeing them as “anything”
machines. I was at Tektronix in the mid-
70s when Tek acquired a company that made
the first non-Intel microprocessor development
system—for the 8008 (Fig. 4). It thus became
necessary to train a sales force comprising the
world’s best analog oscilloscope experts on
how to sell firmware development tools.
The architectural concepts weren’t much of a
problem, but we had to get across what these
things were good for. What were people going
to do with them that wasn’t basically arithmetic?
We guessed at a few simple control situations,
though I don’t think anybody envisioned
the scope of ever-evolving applications you find
at today’s Embedded Systems Conferences.
Oh, we might have. Perhaps the clue
should have been Nolan Bushnell’s “Pong”
game. The legend of the coin box overstuffed
with quarters is too well known (and a
little exaggerated) to retell here. (See computermuseum.50megs.com/pong.htm.) But
Sunnyvale was Sunnyvale and Beaverton was
Beaverton, so some of us missed connecting
with the birth of the gaming boom.
STAGFLATION
Notwithstanding early energy crises, by the
later 1970s, a pervasive IC-based civilian electronics
industry was helping most engineers
bring home regular paychecks, their amounts
ratcheting up to almost keep pace with inflation.
Then came the recession in the U.S. that
began in July 1981 and lasted until November
1982, said to be triggered by the Federal
Reserve’s attempts to attack inflation by making
credit harder to obtain.
By 1980, inflation was 13.5%. In response,
the Fed raised interest rates. The prime hit
21.5% in June 1982. The years 1983 through
most of 1987 were less troublesome. But on
October 19, 1987, the Dow dropped by 22.6%,
triggering the savings and loan crisis and subsequent
congressional bailout. However, those
early 1980s were precisely the time that silicon
hardware caught up with the DSSS theory that
Bell Labs and the military had been working on
back when I was in college.
In the early 1980s, I worked in a PR agency
that picked up a startup client run by a harddriving
sailboat racer named Charlie Trimble.
Trimble had been an IC guy inside Hewlett
Packard and worked on an HP skunk-works
Global Positioning System program. When HP
decided that GPS didn’t fit its business model,
it let Trimble and his cohorts acquire the intellectual
property and start Trimble Navigation.
My assignment at the time was to ghost-write
a pile of articles for the RF and defense-industry
magazines of the day about the GPS. So, as
people inside and outside Trimble explained
the mysteries of Gold codes and chipping
sequences to me, I was tickled to realize that
they were talking about the theory a certain TA
had laid out in a stuffy classroom nearly 20
years before. (It would come up again, nearly
10 years later, when Harris Semiconductor
introduced the first DSSS Wi-Fi chipset while I
was working for Harris’ agency.)
One cool thing about Trimble’s first product
was that it wasn’t a locator. Not enough of the
constellation of NavStar satellites had been
launched to provide consistent coverage. But
they could provide an extremely precise clock.
Trimble began offering a $15,000 benchtop
unit that could be used to recalibrate laboratory
atomic clocks without the need to send
them to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology in the U.S. or to the Bureau
International Des Poids Et Mesures in France.
Trimble’s product not only prevented lab downtime,
it also prevented complex recalibration
following the atomic clocks’ return to service
to account for the relativistic effects related to
shipment by air.
For me, the atomic-clock calibrator may have
obscured the potential for cheap, handheld
positioning units. A few years later, during
the first Gulf War, Trimble’s handheld sales
went through the roof as parents and spouses
bought civilian units to send to loved ones
in Iraq.
DOTCOM BUBBLE AND BUST
More important than GPS in those years was
the penetration of the Internet into ordinary life,
due to the convergence of hypertext and highspeed
TCP/IP, delivered via cable and DSL,
and disseminated around the home and office
by that other embodiment of spread-spectrum,
IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi, first found in Harris
Semiconductor’s PRISM chipset.
It’s almost hard to remember the Internet in
the days when acoustic couplers were in the
home, with mom-and-pop ISPs and text-based
applications, or Unix workstations in the office,
with more text-based applications accessed
from the C shell. Who would have expected in
those days enterprises like Amazon, Google,
PayPal, and eBay? Who would have predicted
server farms that suck electrical power from the
grid on the scale of medium-sized cities?
I wasn’t a particularly early adopter of social
networking, but by 1994, I’d been a regular on
various Usenet newsgroups and the Banjo-L
list server for at least five years. Yet when Jim
Clark and Marc Andreessen released the beta
of Netscape Navigator in 1994, I happened to
be working a couple of blocks down Mountain
View’s Castro Street from the suite over the
bakery occupied by Netscape at the time (a job
that included Harris’ PRISM introduction).
I heard Netscape was handing out free discs,
so I walked over one lunchtime. I didn’t get a
disc, but the receptionist told me how to download
the beta online, and I was wasting company
time on the Web by that afternoon.
The roots of the technology go back to the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Bell Labs, UC Berkeley, the
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), and
Apple (and Ted Nelson). These organizations
had laid the groundwork for what later happened
at CERN and the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the
University of Illinois, resulting in the Web. Once
again, it was a sleeper technology that bided
its time until there was a hitch in the economy,
at which point it exploded on the scene and
rewrote the book of profits.
Continue to page 3
This takes us to the dotcom bust of 2000-
2001, which was like the aerospace bust of
1969, in that it disproportionately affected
technology workers (i.e., I eventually lost my job
again). After peaking at 5132.52 on March 10,
2000 (the pinnacle of “irrational exuberance,”
as Fed chairman Alan Greenspan once characterized
the boom), NASDAQ, the techie index,
collapsed three days later on March 13. On
October 9, 2002, it struck its nadir: 1114.11.
NASDAQ’s highest value since that date (to
mid-April of this year) was 4580, on October
31, 2007. That was the peak of the boom that
started unraveling in early 2008 and whose
low we probably haven’t yet seen. What will
be the next transformational technology (or
technologies), finding its start after the dotcom
crash and growing through the present Great
Recession? I wouldn’t be surprised if it has
something to do with energy efficiency. Or,
maybe it will involve the convergence of energy harvesting, thin-film batteries, and wireless
mesh networks. It’s too soon to tell.
NOW WHAT?
What’s next in the longer term? Maybe
I’m not the best person to ask. I was
gazing at vacuum-tube filaments (and
tweaking a regenerative-feedback knob!)
while the IC was being launched. I made
TV tapes to tell oscilloscope salesmen
that microprocessors might be good for
telling washing machines when to rinse.
I wrote articles explaining how GPS could
calibrate atomic clocks. True, I was a premature
adopter of social networking, but
Usenet and listservers do not equate to
eBay and Twitter.
On the other hand, here we are in
another of those episodes that find thousands
of EEs trying to figure ways to get
their resumes into the short stack and out
of the tall stack. (Hint: it’s good to know
Python; forget FORTRAN IV; calibrate the
hiring manager before you bring up Forth.)
Maybe I’ve learned something. Still, I’m
not going to pick technologies. Yet it does
make sense for engineers to look at how
the electronics business has been changing
recently to see how these shifts align
with their skills.
Certain changes have been obvious.
Chip production has been largely based
in Asia for decades, starting even before
Intel abandoned the memory business in
the 1980s. One can argue whether that’s
because of lax environmental laws there,
or more willingness to invest in expensive
fabs, or both. The original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) center of mass has more
recently shifted to Asia, in turn creating
growth in smaller original design manufacturers
(ODMs) to support them.
OEMs are like traditional car manufacturers.
They make branded products for
end users. ODMs are like auto parts suppliers.
They make anonymous subassemblies.
Or, the two are like primes and subcontractors
in the aerospace business.
Pick your industry. Either way, OEM/ODM
engineering tends toward industrial design
and manufacturing efficiency. But of more
interest is where the gee-whiz parts of the
design are carried out.
Over the years, I’ve watched semiconductor
vendors make parts with better
and better specs in a perpetual game
of leapfrog. Yet recently, there’s been a
change. In the past, the better the parts
performed, the harder they were to use.
The broader the amplifier bandwidth, for
instance, the more difficult it was to keep
it from oscillating in a circuit. The current
OEMs and ODMs have changed that.
They will now (somewhat reluctantly)
pay a few extra pennies for components
that are less sensitive to layout. In fact,
they would rather not deal with basic
components. They respond much more
positively when a chip vendor works with
them to provide maybe not a “black”
box, but some shade of “gray” box—one
that performs a higher-level function at a
higher level of performance than a “white”
box made of off-the-shelf parts.
In essence, they’re “reverse-outsourcing”
the most challenging parts of their
designs to chip makers or independent
design houses (IDHs), or a combination of the two. (Good IDHs seem to be prime
acquisition targets for chip companies.)
And where the IDHs are located
doesn’t seem important.
When Analog Devices decided that
microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS) microphones were the coming
thing, it acquired AudioAsics, a
Copenhagen-based IDH that had a separate
design center in Bratislava. There
are other hot analog IDHs in Dublin
and Edinburgh, and ADI has a strong
captive operation in Limerick. Cork is a
hotbed of DSP design. It all seems to
depend on certain professors and the
universities that support them. Think
in terms of Fred Terman, at Stanford,
updated and cloned dozens of times
around the globe.
What might be the roots of the next
stealth technology? We’re due for
something transformational to come
along and create the next Google or
iPod. I certainly don’t know, but it’s
easy to guess that it might have a
greenish cast. And it’s not too farfetched
to think it might be connected
to consumer demand from a rising middle
class in China and/or India. The
trick might lie in thinking how those
21st century middle classes would be
different than the 19th and 20th century
middle classes in Europe and
the Americas.
Cypress’ T.J. Rogers recently shared
some interesting tidbits. I’m not claiming
to know what T.J. thinks, but the
notion I took away was that China is
too big and culturally different to follow
a Western pattern of growth, with interior
cities linked by freeways and
a seamless power and communications
grid.
Instead, in the interior, think of separate,
self-sufficient urban population
centers with specialized manufacturing
capabilities, self-powered by solar-thermal
or pebble-bed nuclear plants and
surrounded by agricultural resources.
Then decide what you want to design
for that kind of environment.
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